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Abstract 
This exploration piece challenges the dominant reading of oil-related social conflicts through 
an environmental prism. Through a methodological intervention that classifies conflicts as 
‘brown’ (concerning primarily the distribution and investment of economic rents) or ‘green’ 
(demanding ecological remediation, improved extraction practices, or cessation of oil extrac-
tion altogether), it analyses a database of oil related conflicts in the Northern Ecuadorian Am-
azon. The region is particularly suitable for such a study not only because oil extraction has a 
long history there but also because the resulting conflagration has been well-documented. 
Building on the finding that twenty-two of the thirty-six cases that could be classified along 
this dichotomous divide are “brown”, the article problematizes the extant scholarly literatures’ 
conceptualization and discusses the potential analytical benefits of recognizing that some 
movements might be motivated primarily by concerns that are not necessarily environmental. 
A more thorough recognition of the motives underpinning contentious action concerning ex-
tractive industries is also a prerequisite for understanding the policy influence of social mobi-
lization. Keywords: conflict, hydrocarbons, extractivism, indigenous people, environmental 
justice. 
Resumen: Petróleo y conflicto en el Amazonas ecuatoriano: Una exploración de motivos y 
objetivos 
La presente exploración desafía la lectura dominante de los conflictos sociales relacionados 
con el petróleo a través de un prisma ambiental. Mediante una intervención metodológica que 
clasifica los conflictos como “marrón” (principalmente en relación con la distribución y la 
inversión de las rentas económicas) o “verde” (que exigen reparación ecológica, prácticas de 
extracción mejoradas o el cese de la extracción de petróleo en su totalidad), se analiza una 
base de datos de petróleo relacionada con los conflictos en el norte de la amazonia ecuatoriana. 
La región es particularmente adecuada para un estudio de este tipo, no solo porque la 
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extracción de petróleo tiene una larga historia, sino también porque la conflagración resultante 
está bien documentada. Sobre la base del hallazgo de que veintidós de los treinta y seis casos, 
que podrían clasificarse a lo largo de esta división dicotómica, son “marrones”, el artículo 
problematiza la conceptualización de la literatura académica existentes y discute los posibles 
beneficios analíticos de reconocer que algunos movimientos pueden estar motivados princi-
palmente por preocupaciones que no son necesariamente ambientales. Un reconocimiento más 
profundo de los motivos que sustentan la acción contenciosa sobre las industrias extractivas 
también es un requisito previo para comprender la influencia política de la movilización so-
cial. Palabras clave: conflicto, hidrocarbonos, extractivismo, indígenas, justicia medioam-
biental. 
Introduction 
Extractive activities are globally entangled with a number of conflicts that have 
come to be seen primarily as environmental conflicts, analysed through such 
conceptual frames as “ecological distribution conflicts” and “environmental jus-
tice movements” (Martínez-Alier et al., 2016; Nixon, 2011). Consequently, ow-
ing also to the considerable and otherwise laudable presence of an ethic of “ac-
tivist scholarship” within these prevailing approaches, the literature has often 
highlighted certain aspects of societal responses to oil in a way that gives an 
impression of them as being “against” oil extraction, an assertion that is not em-
pirically tested. Furthermore, much of this literature has been built around case 
studies. This has resulted in what can be seen as a sequential approach to ana-
lysing responses to oil extraction, with researchers either conducting longitudi-
nal investigation of a particular case or documenting the emergence of the latest 
one. Despite recent attempts to create larger data sets concerning environmental 
conflicts (e.g. Greyl et al., 2013), our understanding of them is shaped and con-
strained by the analytical choices made in these studies. This exploration piece 
suggests ways of overcoming these shortcomings illustrated through an analysis 
of a novel database of such conflicts. To be clear, the database collects cases of 
contentious action (such as strikes or roadblocks) that we see as manifestations 
of conflict. Thus, contentious actions imply conflict, but conflict does not nec-
essarily express itself solely through contentious action. In other words, the ab-
sence of contentious action does not imply the absence of (latent) conflict. In 
line with the praxis in the environmental conflict literature, we are examining 
evidence generated from the analysis of contentious action and generalizing our 
findings to conflict. 
 The database in question focuses on the northern Ecuadorian Amazon, an 
emblematic area that has attracted much scholarly attention and where hydrocar-
bon extraction coincides with outstanding natural values, indigenous people and 
long-lasting social movements (e.g. Martínez-Alier, 2011; Pappalardo, De 
Marchi & Ferrarese, 2013; Sawyer, 2004; Rival, 2002). Departing from the com-
mon practice where social mobilization and conflict surrounding oil extraction 
is treated with an a priori designation of an environmental conflict, our analysis 
of the data pays attention to the underlying motivations of social actors engaging 
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in contentious action. Rather than reducing them to instances of anti-oil activism, 
we focus on their specific motivations to characterize them as “green”, “brown”, 
or “mixed”. The communities in question have made different demands, some 
choosing to ask for more jobs while others demanded the total and complete 
abolition of the oil sector in their territories (or in the whole of Ecuador!) This 
paper disentangles the motivations observed in such conflicts with a view to cre-
ating a more systematic and clearer understanding of contentious action sur-
rounding oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Building on these findings, this piece 
aims to create a debate around the methodological and ontological assumptions 
that dominate in the study of conflicts surrounding extractive processes. 
 While we are not aware of other studies taking on this issue in the oil sector 
of Ecuador, Arellano-Yanguas found similar results when examining conflict 
concerning mining in Peru (2011). In fact, most of the conflicts in the mining 
sector in the period 2005-2008, based on data from the Defensoría del Pueblo, 
had to do with the allocation of rents allotted to local government, and conflicts 
increased with the increased decentralization of royalties. In a related vein, re-
luctant support for or acquiescence to extractive industries, which can be puz-
zling given the extensive and generally well-known socio-environmental liabil-
ities they have engendered, have also received scant attention in studies that 
found that they are the result of skewed power structures or missing development 
alternatives (Gaventa, 1982; Jerolmack & Walker, 2018; Arsel, Pellegrini, & 
Mena, 2019; Adaman, Arsel & Akbulut, 2018). 
Oil extraction and development in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
Since the start of exploration in the north of the Amazon in the 1920s, oil has 
held a transformative potential in Ecuadorian socioeconomic imaginary. A 
breakthrough was the discovery in the Amazon of the first productive well in 
Lago Agrio in 1967, a town whose official name – Nueva Loja – has been su-
perseded by a popular name that is a translation of Texaco’s base in the United 
States, Sour Lake, Texas. Five years later, the production of oil began with a 
great spectacle that brought together the country’s key centres of power: a bishop 
blessed the first barrel as the military dictator Guillermo Rodríguez Lara initiated 
the flow of oil. Forging oil’s evident image as a central asset, the first barrel of 
production was transported through Quito on a tank and deposited into the tem-
ple of heroes at a military academy. A genuine sense of hope and expectation 
marked this episode, which, despite repeated setbacks and disappointments, the 
country has refused to completely abandon to this date (cf. Pellegrini, 2018). 
Thus, while the “petroleum period” ended in the 1980s (with the decline of 
prices) (Falconí-Benítez, 2001; Sawyer, 2004, 11), the central role of this re-
source in Ecuadorian politics has not been toppled. 
 The ensuing years of socio-economic crises might have dampened the coun-
try’s enthusiasm for oil-led development, but this has proved to be temporary. 
In fact, the economic hardship that characterized this era, marked by neoliberal 
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austerity, has itself fueled a backlash that culminated in the “Pink Tide” that 
carried President Rafael Correa and the “extractive imperative” that defined his 
rule (Arsel, Hogenboom & Pellegrini, 2016). That the early 2000s saw a spike 
in commodity prices that echoed the 1970s has certainly played a role in oil’s 
return to primacy (and the parallel rise of mining as well). In addition to the 
especially aggressive push by the Correa administration to “nationalize” the ex-
tractive sector (which in effect meant that the state renegotiated contracts that 
gave more authority over and greater share of revenues from resources), the main 
difference between these two waves can be seen in the social-environmental 
promises made in the latter. This was partially a response to the already existing 
grievances corresponding to past environmental liabilities and partially an at-
tempt to stymie potential resistance, especially by Ecuador’s dynamic environ-
mental activist sector (which eventually found itself criminalized and harassed) 
(Becker, 2013). After several years of intense activity and expectations, oil’s role 
has once again receded somewhat in the wake of diminished oil prices and the 
replacement of President Correa with President Lenin Moreno, who is far less 
of a firebrand than his predecessor. 
 At the level of national governance, much of the political debate has focused 
not on whether the “resource curse” prevalent in the country can be overcome 
but on how. The stark differences between different types of administrations 
highlighted above correspond to shifting perceptions on this question, which, 
however, is not the focus of this paper. Neither does this paper focus on national-
level environmental mobilization. For example, the paper does not engage with 
the debate surrounding the Yasuni-ITT initiative and other similar macro pro-
cesses (see, e.g., Arsel, 2012). Rather it focuses on conflicts emerging from com-
munities at the frontline of oil extraction. Over the years, indigenous and colono 
communities have challenged the presence of extractive processes in their terri-
tories in a variety of ways. At times, some of them have tried to reason with the 
operators, choosing to pursue dialogue and negotiation. Other times, some have 
taken direct action, such as blocking roads and oil installations (Fontaine, 2007). 
In arguably the best known and most sustained form of waging conflict, activists 
have pursued a legal route, seeking to hold Texaco-Chevron accountable for the 
damages its operations wrought on local ecosystems and public health alike (Ki-
merling, 2013), which led to the remarkable but so far unenforced decision in an 
Ecuadorian court that ordered the company to pay US$9.5 billion in compensa-
tion (Martínez-Alier, 2011). 
 Since oil exploration continues to be the major economic activity in the Ori-
ente, social mobilization and conflict remain a prominent, if episodic, presence 
in its political life. What is important to note, however, and what this paper seeks 
to illuminate, is that given the enduring power of oil-related expectations and the 
lack of other channels through which societal demands can be expressed, the 
array of conflicts in the region cannot be reduced to anti-extractivism. 
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Conflict and oil operations 
This article focuses on conflict associated with hydrocarbon extraction, a part of 
the broader phenomenon of social mobilization (cf. Giugni, 2007, 59). Conflict 
is often defined by contrasting it with the alternative situation of dialogue 
(Bavinck, 2014). In fact, such a dichotomous definition can be misleading. Tak-
ing a dynamic stance, and looking at the evolution of relations over time, conflict 
is often a premise for dialogue (Orta-Martínez, Pellegrini, & Arsel, 2018). For 
example, in several cases of contentious action in our study area, be it a road 
block or the occupation of an oil installation, the objective of these movements 
was to either initiate meaningful dialogue with high-ranking state authorities, or 
to achieve the effective implementation of existing agreements that had been 
reached through previous rounds of dialogue. Thus, the action was considered a 
necessary precondition to engage otherwise indifferent state authorities. Accord-
ingly, we understand contentious action as a transitory manifestation of conflict 
that can generate the conditions for dialogue and overcome conflict. 
 Direct experience through fieldwork in the area, undertaken intermittently in 
the period 2011-2018, led the authors to recognize that motivations underpinning 
contentious actions vary from case to case and that a comprehensive database 
would be necessary to examine the issue systematically. The purposefully built 
database includes 46 cases of contentious action taking place from the year 2000 
to the first half of 2018. The method to identify and include cases in the database 
was based on national and local mass media that have web-based interfaces and 
could be searched online. The information collected was complemented by first-
hand knowledge of contentious action that took place during fieldwork or that 
involved organizations or individuals related to the research team.1  
 In terms of the actors engaging in various forms of contentious action, they 
include local unions, environmentalists, spontaneous popular movements with 
or without the support of local elected authorities, indigenous people, and set-
tlers’ organizations. The actors involved are multiple and defy clear-cut charac-
terizations since many categories are transversal with respect to one another. 
Additionally, over time some mobilizations have taken different trajectories ex-
panding or shrinking in terms of popular involvement and geographical cover-
age. 
 In terms of uncovering the motives underpinning the various forms of con-
tentious action, we proceed retroductively by focusing on the objectives and de-
mands put forward during the mobilization. From these objectives and demands, 
we classified the motives underpinning the mobilization in three categories: 
“green”, “brown” and “mixed”. The green motives are those whose objectives 
refer to environmental claims, broadly understood, and would either require sub-
stantial changes in the way oil extraction is taking place (for example, would 
require significant investment in the maintenance and replacement of pipelines 
to reduce the risk of oil spills), or would require existing extraction to be de-
creased, limited in terms of expansion perspectives, excluded from certain 
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geographical areas, or stopped altogether. The cases characterized as green in-
clude requests to perform environmental remediation of contaminated soil, de-
crease pollution emissions (including reducing noise), respect territorial rights 
of indigenous people, or halt oil exploration in protected areas. Green objectives 
challenge the “business as usual” model of oil companies and might be incom-
patible with their continued operation and expansion. The brown motives in-
volve the redistribution of rents that are generated through extractive operations. 
The objectives of cases that we classified as brown include increased employ-
ment of the local workforce by the oil company or the construction of infrastruc-
ture, e.g. improved roads and bridges. Brown objectives can coexist with the 
continuing operation and expansion of the oil industry. In fact, some of the 
brown objectives, such as the local labour quota and employment opportunities 
provided by oil companies, implicitly rest on the assumption that the extraction 
of hydrocarbons will continue and may even expand. We used the categorization 
mixed objectives for mobilizations where several demands, referring to green 
and brown objectives, coincide. Examples of these cases include mobilizations 
whose objectives were to obtain improvements in environmental practices and, 
at the same time, increase local employment in the oil sector. Additionally, there 
are a few cases in our database where the motives are not explicit or they do not 
lend themselves to this classification, such as protests demanding the release of 
imprisoned activists. 
 The cases in the database include various forms of contentious action ranging 
from road blocks to lawsuits. An example of a contentious action classified as 
green is a lawsuit that was filed in 2005 by members of the Pacayacu community 
against the state-owned company PetroEcuador. The demands of the plaintiffs – 
also underscored by street protests – were associated with environmental reme-
diation of contaminated areas and socio-economic compensation.2 One example 
of a brown action was the strike that included road blocks and the suspension of 
oil operations in the town of Dayuma in 2007. In this case the demand of the 
movement was the implementation of a prior agreement to direct investments in 
road infrastructure and bridge building to the oil producing area.3  
 Clearly, the classification into green, brown and mixed motives and mobili-
zations is to be understood as an analytically-motivated shorthand that is func-
tional to a descriptive analysis of the universe of mobilizations, but does not 
imply that the mobilizations and all the individuals engaging in them can sim-
plistically be reduced to uniform and single motives. Moreover, some degree of 
arbitrariness is necessary to classify cases that would otherwise fall into a grey 
area. As a consequence of these caveats, the classification proposed here and its 
implementation to the cases in our database should be taken as indicative. 
 Overall, according to our classification criteria, the database includes 22 
cases of brown action, 14 cases of green action, 1 mixed and 9 unclear cases. In 
other words, there is a clear preponderance of contentious action motivated by 
claims over the redistribution of extraction rents if compared to environmentally 
motivated mobilization. 
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Brown motives and “environmental” conflict 
Looking at almost 20 years of oil-related conflicts in the Orellana and Sucum-
bíos provinces of Ecuador, we show that most episodes were associated with 
brown motives. That is, mobilization was motivated by requests to redistribute 
rents, directly via cash disbursements or indirectly via the creation of employ-
ment opportunities or physical infrastructures. This finding runs counter to con-
ventional wisdom for two separate reasons. 
 First, much of the political ecology literature that has focused on such cases 
of conflicts have highlighted the salience of ecological sustainability as a trigger 
for mobilization. It is for this reason that contentious action such as those cov-
ered in our database are often referred to as “ecological distribution conflicts” 
and part of the global “environmental justice movement” (Martínez-Alier et al., 
2016). Second, a class-based reading of “brown” cases challenges dominant 
readings of the connection between identity and environmentalism (Arsel & 
Dasgupta, 2015). More specifically, the dominant approach in the literature, de-
spite oft-repeated disavowals of the trope of the “noble savage”, has been reluc-
tant to let go of the (often unspoken) expectation that indigenous and other local 
communities remain as the last barrier between nature and a rapacious global 
capital that can only perceive the Amazon through the lens of a profit motive, 
reducing all wealth to cash value. That the majority of cases demand different 
economic outcomes rather than the complete cessation of extractive processes 
therefore calls for questioning the putative “green” credentials of local commu-
nities, indigenous or otherwise. 
 The proposed methodology here can deliver another analytical gain, one that 
concerns mobilization effectiveness (cf. Silva, 2017). In fact, an in-depth explo-
ration of the motives underpinning and objectives of social mobilization is a 
necessary condition when exploring the role played by social movements in 
shaping public policies. Furthermore, assuming that the centres of power tar-
geted by activists are able to deliver certain demands more readily than others, 
it might be possible to connect the feasibility of mobilization outcomes with their 
corresponding demands. For instance, the Ecuadorian state might be more will-
ing to respond positively to a movement that demands a guarantee that a per-
centage of jobs at an oil installation should be reserved for local residents rather 
than one that calls for the abandonment of oil extraction. There are indications 
that this was indeed the case with the Amazon Law that was passed by the Ec-
uadorian assembly in May 2018. Assuming that movements exercise a degree of 
reflexivity about their demands, it would then be possible to apprehend the 
“greenness” or “brownness” of movements not as inherent qualities but as stra-
tegic choices. Moreover, prevalence of brown cases should not lead to the facile 
conclusion that the local population and social organizations at large are satisfied 
with the impact of the oil industry. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case: 
many people are cognizant of the negative impacts and consider the oil industry 
responsible for a deterioration of livelihoods at the family, community and 
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regional level but are constrained in their choices and in their developmental 
perspectives (Arsel, Pellegrini, & Mena, 2019). As a consequence, people might 
not engage in contentious action but experience their discontent in a state of la-
tent conflict. Alternatively, engaging in brown conflict can be seen as the only 
viable strategy to improve one’s prospect once development alternatives are (be-
lieved to be) out of reach. 
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Notes 
1. The database was constructed using web-based search engines (Google, DuckDuckGo), 
academic search engines (Google Scholar), searches through the global atlas of environ-
mental justice movements (EJAtlas), and searches through national and local news portals 
(El Comercio, El Telégrafo, La Hora, Periódico Espectador Amazónico, Periódico Inde-
pendiente, Radio Sucumbíos). Search terms included combinations of the words conflict 
(conflict), roadblock (bloqueo), strike (paro) with the names of the two provinces (Orel-
lana and Sucumbíos) and terms related to the oil sector (petróleo, petrolera). Recollections 
of conflicts encountered during field work by team members was also used to complement 
the information. 
2. See “Caso Pacayacu,” 2016; “Pacayacu y la mano sucia de Petroamazonas,” 2017. 
3. See Aguirre, 2008; “Dayuma Ecuador”, 2012. 
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